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Abstract 
In January 2014 a reformed CFP came into force in the EU. The reformed policy 
tackled many of the policy field’s troubled areas and offered realistic solutions for 
elements of the policy which had been criticised for years by academics, 
stakeholders and even EU institutions. The purpose of this thesis is to explain how 
the reformed policy came about and in doing so it adopts a case study design 
which allows for an in-depth study of the policy field. The thesis’ material is 
primarily made up of official documents and secondary sources. In order to help 
clear up the complexities of the recent changes and understand the process 
involved, a theoretical framework was created that makes use of punctuated 
equilibrium theory, path dependency and the concept of policy windows.  
The paper’s findings suggest that the reforms which came into effect in 2014 
are a part of a path dependent process that dates back to the 1990s. However, in 
order to place the CFP on this path, an event was required to rupture the 
equilibrium of the policy field. This destabilising event came about through 
international environmental negotiations at the UN. This would allow the 
European Commission to act as a policy entrepreneur and push for further 
reaching policy changes. However, for years the Council of Ministers withstood 
fundamental changes and a policy window was required to create the conditions 
where the reformed policy proposal could be agreed upon by the major decision 
making institutions. External pressures can be an essential factor in reforming 
policy fields where it has been hard to bring about change.  
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1 Introduction 
Below, a short introduction chapter discusses the paper’s subject. The paper’s 
research questions and aim are introduced, the paper’s contribution is discussed 
before previous research is examined and the relevant definitions are provided.  
 
1.1 General introduction 
“We find ourselves in a vicious circle. We have subsidised fishing capacity 
and helped the European fleet modernise. As a result, the fleet has grown 
too big for the stocks, and the stocks are depleted. The fewer fish are left to 
catch, the more the industry's profit margins are squeezed. So fishers try to 
fish even more to make up the loss of earnings and so we subsidize further. 
And so on and so forth.”  
Joe Borg 2009a.  
 
 
The description above was used by the then Commissioner responsible for 
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, when describing the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) in 2009 as the Green paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy 
was adopted. This admission by Joe Borg was interesting as the Commissioner 
effectively conceded that that previous reforms had failed. Overall the European 
Union’s (EU) fisheries employed over 120.000 workers on full time basis (STECF 
2013, p. 17) and accounted for almost 1% of the total EU budget or EUR 4.3 
billion (European Commission, 2013). Hence the admission of mismanagement of 
the policy field by the commissioner responsible for it meant that the pressure was 
on to deliver fundamental reforms.  
On January 1
st
 2014 a reformed CFP came into force within the EU. The 
reform process followed extensive negotiations between the relevant EU 
institutions and can be regarded as being quite fundamental reforms to the policy 
field. While the reforms are so recent that as of yet little research has taken place 
where they are scrutinised. However, it can be said that they tackled many 
longstanding issues of the CFP often cited by critics. In the reformed policy four 
main goals can be identified, first to stop overfishing, second to end the discarding 
of fish, third to increase regionalization within the policy and fourth to have 
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sustainable standards for EU fisheries (Damanaki 2014). There is ample literature 
by those that maintain that the CFP has been a troubled area within the EU for an 
extended time.
1
 Constant overfishing has left many stocks of fish endangered 
which would have dramatic effects on the fisheries industry throughout Europe 
and not to mention the environment. Large subsidies for the industry as a whole 
have been questioned and the CFP has been accused of being overly centralised. 
The overall common theme of the reformed policy can be said to involve a stance 
to promote sustainable development and responsible exploitation of the fisheries 
resource. However, there is evidence to suggest that these changes were over two 
decades in the making and in this paper I will attempt to trace the evolution of 
said changes, the rationale behind them, and particularly how the recent reforms 
which took effect in January 2014 can be explained.  
The CFP is somewhat a special policy field within the EU as it involves a truly 
common resource, fish, where the various member states must share the resource.  
One might imagine that the EU should be in an optimum position to tackle the 
dilemma of how effectively to distribute the rights to efficient and responsible 
exploitation of this resource among its member states, through the pre-existing 
centralised mechanisms in the EU. However, this has not been the case and 
instead the policy field has seen the member states which have more pressing 
interests when it comes to the fisheries industry, scramble to receive as large 
proportion of the available quota as possible. This has led to overfishing and at the 
beginning of the new millennium several important EU fishing stocks were 
believed to be over exploited and nearing depletion (Payne 2000, p. 304). 
In this paper a theoretical framework using punctuated equilibrium theory, 
path dependency and policy windows will be used. In doing so, this thesis uses a 
case study analysis involving an in-depth historical examination of the CFP. The 
analytical framework will help identify the factors needed to bring about reforms 
to an EU policy field, thus explaining why a certain policy field can be difficult to 
reform and how change can be brought on. Here, the CFP was more or less 
stagnant for an extended time and an external event was needed to bring about 
change in the system.  
 
1.2 Aim and research question 
The study aims to discover how the EU brought about and agreed on an extensive 
reform package after decades of unsuccessful policy which came into force in 
2014. Hence, this paper has a somewhat general aim and involves a relatively 
high level of abstraction where the conceptual meaning can be broadened out 
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(Benson & Jordan 2012, p. 336). Here, the following research questions will be 
addressed: 
 
1. Why was there a successful reform of the Common Fisheries Policy possible 
in 2013, after years of ineffective policy and unsuccessful attempts at reforms? 
 
2. What do the reforms to the Common Fisheries Policy indicate about policy 
reforms in the EU in general? 
 
1.3 Previous research 
Through the years the CFP has been a popular subject for scholars of various 
disciplines. That is to be expected since the EU has been unable to avoid the 
“[t]he tragedy of the commons” (European Commission 2011, p. 2) where a 
common resource is overexploited, despite seemingly having all the tools and 
means to control the resource responsibly and fairly.  
While the CFP had been popular among scholars doing economical and 
fisheries management studies, somewhat less has been written on it regarding 
policy studies. Jill Wakefield took a normative look at the proposed reforms in 
two recent papers (Wakefield 2013; Wakefield 2012). Loizou et al. (2013) studied 
the impact of sustainable development of rural coastal areas within the proposed 
CFP reforms. David Symes (2012) studied the 2012 CFP reforms with regards to 
regionalising the EU fisheries and increased decentralisation of decision making 
in the policy area. Raakjær (2011) viewed the social, economic and political 
influences brought on by the CFP and found that certain problems caused by the 
CFP could be mended by changing the institutional structure of the policy field. 
Princen (2010) looked at the 2002 CFP reforms and stated that in EU policy-
making the policy content was equally important to the institutions involved in the 
process and that policy images and policy venues had changed. Markus (2010) 
examined the 2009 Green Paper proposing a review of the CFP, analysing how 
subsidies affected the policy field and what takes for a policy to be efficient and 
encourage sustainable fishing in the Unions waters. Hegland and Raakjaer (2008) 
stated that the fisheries policy was stuck on a specific path due to path dependence 
in the system itself. Payne (2000) used game theory to explain the failure of the 
CFP. Indeed, scholar have criticised elements of the CFP for decades as is evident 
in Stephen Cunningham’s critique of the CFP objectives in 1980 (Cunningham 
1980).  
Path dependency framework has been used at length to analyse political 
systems in the United States and Europe. There is ample literature on path 
dependency in economics and technology, but this paper makes use of the 
historical institutional approach to path dependency (Thelen 1999, p. 387-388). 
Influential scholars have recently advocated the use of path dependency in 
analysing political processes. Paul Pierson studied the temporal aspects processes 
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and how increasing returns can shape path dependent processes (Pierson 2000a; 
Pierson 2000b). With regards to the European context, Adrian Kay used path 
dependency to explain the policy process of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in an attempt to understand the policy direction there within (Kay 2003). 
Furthermore, in an attempt to explain the evolution of the CAP, Carsten 
Daugbjerg (2009) uses reactive sequences rather than more common approach of 
path dependency, self-reinforcing processes, in explaining the policy process of 
the CAP.  
 
1.4 Scope and contribution 
The aim of this paper is to explain how the 2013 CFP reforms can be explained 
and how to understand the overall reform process of the CFP. There are separate 
rules that relate to various fringe areas of maritime affairs in the EU. These 
include rules on the creation of a market for fisheries products, the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and various specific rules on the external 
dimension of the policy, which I will address only in passing. Instead, in this 
paper I intend to examine the basic regulation of the CFP which addresses how 
fish stocks are managed and how this regulation has evolved since its creation, 
identifying to forces of change. Furthermore, the analysis used here involves a 
relatively high level of analysis, meaning I will indentify the principle institutions 
involved on the EU level and use an analysis based on temporality in order to get 
a clear understanding of the events that transpired within the policy field.  
The paper’s contribution lies in the showing how policy change can occur in a 
policy field which has proved difficult to reforms. The theoretical framework used 
helps identify the relevant components needed to bring about fundamental 
changes to an isolated policy field. Furthermore, I ask what the findings of this 
paper can tell us about policy reforms in a wider EU context. I found that there 
seemed to lack a study that takes an in-depth look at the fisheries policy within the 
EU and examines the rationale behind the latest reforms and examines how this 
policy field, described as being stuck in a political deadlock due to its “nested 
institutional context” (Payne 2000, p. 311) finally saw real reform. 
 
1.5 Definitions 
For clarification purposes some pressing definitions will be provided for from the 
beginning. Although the literature on path dependency is primarily focused on 
institutions it can also be used when analysing public policies (Daugbjerg 2009, p. 
397). Hence, in this paper public policies, such as the CFP, will be regarded as an 
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institution. With that in mind, Pierson argues that “major public policies also 
constitute major rules of the game, influencing the allocation of economic and 
political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with alternative 
political strategies, and consequently altering ensuing political development” 
(Pierson 1993, p. 596). Furthermore, Adrian Kay, finds that institutions are 
defined by “shared concepts between humans in situations of repeated interaction 
that are prescriptions for behaviour that are enforced by external agency (rules) or 
by the individuals themselves (norms), or derive from strategies that individuals 
adopt within the accepted rules, norms and their expectations about how 
everybody else will behave” (Kay 2003, p. 407). The definition set above allows 
the CFP to be regarded as an institution and not merely as a public policy, 
allowing for the use of frameworks more commonly used to examine institutional 
setups. 
In general terms, policy making is readily viewed as a policy cycle. Analysts 
generally agree that it is made up of agenda-setting, policy shaping, decision 
making, implementation and finally evaluation (Buonanno and Nugent 2013, p. 
101). While some might say that the policy cycle is too simple to fully grasp the 
complexities of modern day decision making, with some simplification these are 
the steps necessary for a policy to go from an idea to becoming a reality. In 
modern day liberal democracies these different steps may be affected by different 
actors, the main ones being politicians, bureaucrats and various interest groups. In 
the EU context these actors are also present, the bureaucrats in the Commission 
are quite influential in the early phases of the decision making process. The role 
of the politicians is mostly in two institutions; first the EP where the directly 
elected parliamentarians are active in the making of EU legislation, and second, in 
the Council of Ministers where ministers from each member state sit together, is 
also very important when it come to the latter stages of the EU’s legislative 
process. Interest groups are quite prominent in the EU, attempting to lobby for 
certain outcome and offering expertise, they will often attempt to influence the 
Commission when creating draft legislations as it is most accessible to outside 
influence. However, the Council of Ministers, where national ministers preside 
has historically been a staunch defender of national interests (Young 2010, p. 49-
50).  
The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty brought the ordinary legislative 
procedure
2
 to the CFP for the first time (Lutchman & Adelle 2008, p. 21-22). The 
procedure involves the three institutions mentioned above, the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EP participating in the legislative 
procedure. Here the decision making procedure starts with the Commission 
drafting a proposal which the Council and the EP decide on together. This process 
can include up to three readings of proposals being passed between the two. If the 
two are unable to agree on the proposal it does not pass (Wallace 2010, p. 83). 
Before the Lisbon treaty came into force in 2008, the role of the EP was 
considerably more limited. The Commission would submit a proposal to the 
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Council which then would consult the EP. However the Council was in no way 
obligated to take the view of the EP into consideration and could proceed without 
its backing (Chalmers et al. 2010, p. 110).  
The CFP is an area of exclusive competence but the treaties make a distinction 
between areas of exclusive competence and shared competence when it comes to 
legislation. This means that in the field of exclusive competence only the EU can 
legislate while in fields of shared competence the member states may legislate 
where the EU has not done so (Chalmers et al. 2010, p. 207-208). The fields that 
belong to exclusive competences are rather few in numbers as this involves almost 
total surrender of decision making from the member states to the EU institutions. 
 
1.6 Outline 
In chapter two of this thesis I introduce the papers theoretical framework which is 
made up of three different concepts. This framework will help me unmask the 
various processes and events that have taken place inside and outside the policy 
field. The framework is intended to help explain the policy process and involves 
the concepts of punctuated equilibrium theory, path dependency and policy 
windows. Chapter three focuses on the research method, the use of a case study 
and how this method will help me answer the paper’s research questions. Chapter 
four introduces the historical background of the CFP and traces its evolution. 
Chapter five features the empirical analysis of the paper and will present answers 
to the paper’s research questions before the sixth chapter will sum up the paper’s 
overall findings. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
In the following chapter a theoretical framework will be introduced that is 
primarily made up of three separate concepts; path dependency, punctuated 
equilibrium theory and the policy windows approach. When attempting to make 
sense of the policy process of a complex sui generis political and legal structure 
like the EU, such a framework can help make sense of complex processes and 
events. Furthermore, due to the inherent complexities of the EU’s policy process it 
is quite helpful to use theories to examine the subject for simplification and to get 
a better grasp of the process (Sabatier 2007, p. 4-5). 
 
2.1 Path dependency 
Path dependency is based on historical institutionalism which sees institutions as 
“product of concrete temporal processes” (Thelen 1999 p. 384). It involves the 
idea that the institutions are reflections of a larger political and social landscape 
involving elements of inertia and change. Those who adhere to historical 
institutionalism are generally quite focused on studying how institutions came 
about and their likelihood to change (Thelen 1999, p. 370). Historical 
institutionalism belongs to a school of thought generally called the new 
institutionalism that surfaced in the 1990s. Paul Pierson states that analysis based 
on historical institutionalism should help explain political processes, one should 
study them over time that the institutions can have an impact on the actors around 
them, constraining possible options, and that case study analysis can be influential 
in understanding political change (Pierson 1993, p. 598). Change either happens 
incrementally through sequences where small steps are taken in an effort to bring 
about change, or through critical junctures where decisions taken at earlier steps 
in the life spans of institutions can have substantial influence at later intervals for 
those institutions. In fact, historical institutionalism has been quite popular when 
analysing the EU integration process (Pollack 2010, p. 21-23). 
Path dependency can be described as concept rather than a strict political 
theory, as it is particularly efficient when it comes to identifying and classifying a 
process that enfolds over a certain period in time. James Mahoney states that 
analyses that are based on path dependency have three defining features (2000, p. 
510-511). First, these analyses examine processes that are dependent on an event 
that happened at a previous stage in some sort of a historical sequence. Second, 
these historical events are dependent incidents which cannot be explained solely 
on the basis of a previous event or on initial configurations. Third, after an 
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unforeseeable historical event has taken place the process that follows is called 
‘inertia’ and involves a certain course of action taking place which will lead to an 
outcome based the event that took place previously. 
Adrian Kay states that a political system can be described as being path 
dependant when “initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same 
direction; in other words there are self-reinforcing mechanisms or positive 
feedbacks” (2003, p. 403). Increasing returns and positive feedback mean that 
when steps are taken in a specific direction, it will further increase the chances 
that more steps in the same direction. This is because the cost of exit becomes 
higher as more steps are taken in a specific way (Pierson 2000b, p. 252). 
Furthermore, that “[i]n path-dependent sequences, the key mechanism at work is 
some form of self-reinforcement or positive feedback loop. Initial moves in a 
particular direction encourage further movement along the same path” (Pierson 
2000a, p. 74). Institutional change in this version of path dependency can be 
likened to steering a big ship, as swift turns are difficult to make.  
Path dependency framework has both strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths 
lay in the framework’s ability to highlight the importance of a timeline in any 
policy analysis. Thus, path dependence highlights the need to look back at history 
in order to get any sort of a meaningful insight of current affairs, as the options 
available to current policy makers are always constrained by previous events (Kay 
2005, p. 558). In fact, some state that the increasing popularity of the path 
dependent framework is connected to an increasingly “historic turn” in the 
academia (Pierson 2000b, p. 264) where scholars are ever more looking at past 
events, big and small as explanatory factors. 
An inherent danger involved in using path dependency is to ignore policy 
complexity and get caught up in the dualism of stability and change of policy 
(Kay 2005, p. 567). When using path dependency the researcher must look 
towards the mechanisms that produce positive feedbacks because “[w]ithout 
careful attention to the identification of the mechanisms at work, analyses of path 
dependence can easily become descriptions of what happened rather than 
explanations for why it happened” (Pierson 2000a, p. 76). However path 
dependency can be particularly suitable to study policy reforms as demonstrated 
by Adrian Kay when looking at the CAP how one policy reform can have a 
cumulative effect and created the required event to make further reforms possible 
(2003, p, 416-417). 
The term critical juncture is a part of the overall path dependency framework 
and refers to points in time in the past where decisions were made that somehow 
constrain or somehow stifle policy makers within institutions. It involves how 
path dependency is used to make explicit distinction between change and 
stagnation. Here scholars will look at how institutions go through periods of 
change that break longer periods of institutional calm (Streeck & Thelen 2005, p. 
7). Mahoney states that “[c]ritical junctures are characterized by the adoption of a 
particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives. These 
junctures are "critical" because once a particular option is selected it becomes 
progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple 
alternatives were still available” (2000, p. 513). Thus, in these instances policy 
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makers must purposely chose one particular path of action over other alternatives 
and whichever option is chosen will have repercussions for future policymaking 
as critical junctures can be significant in deciding the path dependency of a 
particular institution or policy (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, p. 342). It is also 
worth mentioning that the options available to policy maker and the relevant 
actors at these critical junctures do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, the available 
options come about because of prior events and development put into place often 
long before (Mahoney 2001, p. 113).  
I will state that the reforms to the CFP involved path dependency as the 
reforms involved positive feedbacks, where initial steps towards a ‘greener’ 
policy field lead to the policy field moving further in a ‘greener’ direction due to 
mechanisms of increasing returns. The option to go back became unattainable to 
the policy makers as the cost of exit becomes too high. 
 
2.2 Punctuated equilibrium theory 
Punctuated Equilibrium theory looks to explain both stability and change in policy 
making. The theory can be especially helpful when researchers are looking to 
explain a process or the evolution of a particular policy change. The theory is 
focused on the historical process within a specific policy area. Here the goal is to 
explain why there are occurrences of critical changes to policy fields and 
processes that have been slow moving and stable for long periods of time. 
Punctuated equilibrium theory acknowledges that policymaking is generally 
characterised by incremental change and that the equilibrium can be ruptured, 
allowing changes to occur. The theory focuses on the policy process that contains 
political institutions and policymakers which are constrained by bounded 
rationality. This means the researcher must look at the issues at hand and how the 
agenda setting takes place (True et al. 2007, p. 155-157). 
The theory focuses on the concept of destabilising change and how policy 
subsystems can shift dramatically when external supporting mechanises, for one 
reason or another, shift. The theory first appeared in the 1990s in a book by 
Baumgartner and Jones that examined public policy making in the United States, 
drawing attention to the trend of political systems to have radical changes disrupt 
long spells of incremental change (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, p. 155). The 
theory readily acknowledges that most political systems have inclination to 
involve gradual change and inertia. However, occasionally these political systems 
can suddenly change dramatically and the systems can jump forward. In order for 
a researcher to get an overall picture of the political system, he or she must take a 
prolonged temporal view of the system as a whole, as a short term viewpoint does 
not capture all the parts of the overall jigsaw (Baumgartner et al. 2006, p. 961-
963). Hence, just as in path dependency above, a historical view is necessary in 
order to understand the complexities involved in policy change. 
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When the political system is in a phase of stasis, policy change is resisted by 
negative feedbacks. This decreases the likelihood of major policy change and 
maintains the equilibrium of the system. Positive feedbacks however, work the 
other way and can cause a seemingly moderate change somewhere in or around 
the political system to be intensified and bring about a greater change than 
originally envisaged. Closely connected to negative and positive feedbacks are 
policy images. The term involves information and emotive appeals about the 
policy process. When a policy only has a single policy image, the policy is 
generally accepted and it involves a policy monopoly. However, if there is not a 
consensus about the policy in question, opponents might promote a competing 
policy image, one where different reasoning starts to play a larger role (True et al. 
2007, p. 160-162). Hence, a new policy image allows issues to be framed 
differently than before.  
Punctuated Equilibrium theory belongs to a group of so-called evolutionary 
theories of the institutional perspective. An example of a contrasting evolutionary 
theory would be the Darwinian synthesis which views change as being 
incremental, slow and steady. There are elements of the Darwinian synthesis in 
the works of the great European thinkers like Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, 
who saw historical change as slow moving evolution (Krasner 1988, p. 78). 
Stephen D. Krasner who has written extensively on evolutionary theories 
characterised by punctuated equilibrium, has highlighted some weaknesses in the 
Darwinian synthesis. First, it ignores the impact previous choices can have, thus 
somewhat ignoring how previous choices can place constrains on preceding 
situations. Second, without a punctuated equilibrium view of evolution unforeseen 
change is impossible. Without it, interrelated structures where change in one, will 
affect the other, are ignored (Krasner 1988, p. 79-80). Hence, when looking at the 
standpoints of evolutionary theories, punctuated equilibrium theories strength lay 
in their adaptability when it comes to interrelations between different structures 
and how previous decisions can place constrains on things to come.   
Punctuated equilibrium theory makes no attempt to predict when these 
punctures to the equilibrium will take place. It merely reminds a researcher that 
situations exogenous to the policy field can influence it to a great degree 
(Schlager 2007, p. 310). With that in mind the theory emphasizes the importance 
of looking at the agenda setting and who is involved at the legislative stage. As 
mentioned above those who adhere to punctuated equilibrium, are most interested 
in policy dynamics of political institutions and these institutions are usually 
subject to external pressures when it comes to major change. In fact, a criticism 
heard of punctuated equilibrium is that it ignores the internal aspects of policy 
making (Capano 2009, p. 22-23). The focus is very much on the instances a 
puncture to the policy equilibrium is identified rather than identifying some sort of 
grand scale policy evolution.  
Below, I intend to show how events in the international arena would influence 
the dynamics of the CFP, breaking the negative feedback within the policy field. 
Decisions taken at the UN Earth Summits placed constrains on policy makers 
within the CFP allowing for positive feedback and thus breaking the policy image 
monopoly.  
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2.3 Policy windows  
Policy windows are openings in time which allow policy makers to push through 
solutions to perceived problems or bring attention to specific issues. These 
windows can open either predictably, as a result of certain legislation being 
pushed through, or unpredictably, when policy entrepreneurs must be ready lash 
on to proceedings, in order to make use of the opportunity (Kingdom 2011, p. 
165). Three different streams make up the policy system. First, the problem 
stream which involves a problem of some sort that is acknowledged by policy 
makers. Second is the policies stream which involves the clashing ideas for the 
how to proceed in policy networks. The third and final stream is the politics 
stream which involves three different aspects, national mood, lobbying power and 
“administrative or legislative turnover” (Zahariadis 2007, p. 70-73).  
When the three streams are joined, policy windows are realised for the policy 
entrepreneurs which are a necessary part of the approach as they exploit the 
opportunities that open up (Ackrill et al. 2013, p. 873). These windows are either 
problem windows or political windows. Problem windows open when a problem 
becomes pressing for policy makers and they seek solutions in the policy stream. 
However, a political window opens when there is a change in the political 
structure, through change of government or radical shift in the public opinion 
(Kingdon 2011, p. 174). Hence, when policy entrepreneurs are successful in using 
policy windows they can bring about real change that otherwise would be hard to 
achieve.  
Here, I intend to show that procedural changes brought on by the Lisbon 
Treaty opened a policy window which brought about fundamental changes to the 
CFP which were over two decades in the making. The policy window would be 
characterised as a political window presented an opportunity to bring about clear 
change to the CFP. 
 
2.4 Combining the approaches in a single framework 
This paper attempts to connect different theories together, path dependency, 
punctuated equilibrium theory, and policy windows, in an attempt to better 
understand policy change. A note of caution though in the beginning is that in 
general, studies on policy change can focus overly on the relationship between 
stability on one and change on the other, resulting in dualism. David Marsh 
instead advocates for a position of duality, allowing for the possibility of stability 
and change to coexists in some instances and he goes on to say, “it is crucial to 
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recognize that change occurs within a given political system/policy making 
structure/political tradition etc.; so stability provides the context within which 
change occurs” (Marsh 2010, p. 96).  
This paper’s analysis centres on an EU policy field best categorised as being 
in a stasis. From early on questions of the efficiency of the policy field were asked 
and to some, the policy clearly was neither optimal nor potent in addressing the 
issues at hand. However, policy change happened very slowly in it first years of 
the policy and only incremental at best. In order to break the inertia, an exogenous 
event was required that ruptured the stasis of the policy field. The analytical tool 
for these exogenous circumstances is punctuated equilibrium theory. This external 
event was enough to make the policy field more susceptive to change and allow 
for certain advance in the functioning of the policy field in question. However, 
this change was not sudden or rapid in nature. Rather, it was slow and would take 
place over several years. Path dependency will be the analytical tool for this phase 
of the policy field. Specifically, critical junctures created positive feedbacks, 
where previous decisions constrained decision makers and made it impossible to 
turn back. However, a policy entrepreneur required a policy window to finally be 
able to push through the changes required and that widows appeared due to 
political changes.  
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3 Methodology 
The following chapter focuses on the methodological approaches used in 
answering the research questions put forth in this paper. Here, a case study 
research design is used to examine decisions within a policy field. The case study 
design will allow for detailed examination of the process as a whole, and explain 
the evolution of a process that has taken place throughout the years. First, the 
basic idea behind qualitative research methods is introduced. Second, the case 
studies research method is discussed, laying out its strengths, weaknesses and 
addressing the different case study designs available. Finally, the material and 
limitations are discussed. 
 
3.1 Research design  
The research design used in this paper involves a case study where a reform 
within an EU policy area, the Common Fisheries Policy, is explained using the 
chosen theories. This paper makes use of qualitative research methods, as opposed 
to quantitative methods. The choice of research methods should not merely be 
chosen by coincidence but rather should be suited to the research’s choice of 
theory and data collection methods (Boeije 2010, p. 4). Hence, the research 
question put forth is the predominate factor in deciding which method I will 
employ. There are inherent differences between the two methods, quantitative 
research is situated closer to natural sciences, it is based on positivism and views 
social reality as an objective reality. Qualitative research however focuses more 
on words rather than numbers as is inherent in natural sciences and it generally 
rejects positivism, instead focusing on how the world is socially constructed 
(Bryman 2001, p. 20-21). The strengths of qualitative research lie in the areas 
where quantitative methods seem to be lacking in answers. This predominantly 
applies when dealing with issues of social sciences where there is room for 
interpretation of some sort (Flick 2014, p. 13-14). Here absolute truths are not as 
common as in the natural world and when examining some sort of political or 
institutional setup, research that is centred on words rather than the analysis of 
numbers is likely to yield more convincing results.  
The research being done here on the CFP will primarily focus the examination 
of official documents from the various institutions and is supplemented by 
secondary sources. This is in line with the focus of qualitative research and should 
allow me to explore different processes that take place in the social world which 
would else be difficult to see. Andrew M. Pettigrew calls this procedural analysis 
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and his definition of processes as “a sequence of individual and collective events, 
actions, and activities unfolding over time in context” (Pettigrew 1997, p. 338). 
Hence, it is clear that where I intend to unmask reasons for changes or 
disturbances in the relevant procedures within the CFP, qualitative research is a 
strong choice. 
 
3.2 Case study analysis 
This paper takes a historical view of a single policy field within the EU and it 
involves a within-case analysis of a single unit of analysis (de Vaus 2012, p. 220). 
Here, the 2013 reform to CFP is the unit of analysis and the object of this case 
analysis, however in order to answer the research questions, the analysis will 
require a historical look at the CFP. Hence, this research is a case study involving 
an EU policy field that has proved notoriously difficult to reform and where 
national short term preferences have seemingly mattered more than the 
sustainable development of the policy field as a whole. In the words of George & 
Bennett, the case study method involves a “detailed examination of an aspect of 
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events […]” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 5). Furthermore, 
the method allows for a researcher to get an in-depth picture of a historical event, 
giving insight otherwise difficult to come by. Case study analysis is highly useful 
when the case being examined is complex and multi-layered, meaning other 
research methods might not be able to grasp the whole picture but rather just 
fragments here and there. The case in question might be a country, organization, a 
person or an event, to name a few (Bryman 2001, p. 47-48). Hence, the focus of 
the research is very much on this single entity, examining it thoroughly often 
looking to find factors contributing to its development. 
The strengths of the case study approach, as discussed above, lie in the 
rigorous research involved and are especially helpful when attempting to identify 
a causal process in a specific case. Typically, case studies ask how or why 
questions in order to identify causality. In short the aim of the case study approach 
should be to identify causal processes through these intensive researches (Thomas 
2007, p. 301-302). In this case I intend analyse the empirical information 
regarding the CFP and offer explanations for the development within the policy 
field. Here I intend to use a model to illustrate the causality between the evolution 
of the CFP and the relevant factors. It is worth remembering that “a model is a 
simplification of reality, and a degree of pragmatism is unavoidable” (Davies 
1994, p. 28-29). A case study which is well constructed should shed light on the 
causality involved and which factors are at play (Gerring 2007, p. 45). Hence, I 
will attempt to identify the relevant causal mechanisms that have led the CFP to 
be successfully reformed and increased the sustainable development aspects of the 
policy. 
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George and Bennett identify four major potential benefits of using the case 
study method (2005, p. 19-22). First, the case study method is helps the researcher 
identify and assess the theoretical concept being used each time. This, is 
especially relevant for some of the more vague concepts often being studied in 
political science, such as power, democracy, influence etc. Here the detailed 
nature of case study analysis is of great use. Second, case studies are particularly 
useful when deriving new hypotheses. The very nature of the detailed work 
involved in case studies helps identify new variables and create new theories. 
Third, case studies are valuable when it comes to the identification of causal 
mechanisms. These causal mechanisms can in specific instances, bring about a 
particular outcome. Finally, in the words of George and Bennett, a benefit of case 
studies “is their ability to accommodate complex causal relations such as 
equifinality, complex interactions effects and path dependency” (George & 
Bennett 2005, p, 22). Meaning, when attempting to trace a complex process over 
time, the method is particularly strong. 
Case studies have been criticised for allowing overgeneralization, where a 
doubt is cast on whether a single case can be generalized at all. However, the case 
itself should not be generalized but rather the theoretical proposition being argued 
for in the research. Case studies can sometime become too vast in size and too 
time consuming, but this in no way confined to just case studies but rather applies 
to field work that can be too time consuming (Yin 2009, p. 14-16). Therefore, it 
seems oblivious that many of the pitfalls involved in using case studies can be 
avoided when the researcher is thorough in his or her application of the method. 
To this George and Bennett highlight that case studies can sometimes suffer from 
a ‘degrees of freedom problem’ where it becomes difficult to select the right 
explanation from two or more competing explanations. Connected to this, the 
researcher conducting a case study must ensure the independence of one case 
from another in order to uncover all explanations and causes involved (George & 
Bennett 2005, p. 32-33).  
Single case analysis as implied by the name involves the analysis of a single 
case, as opposed to the multiple case designs. Yin (2009, p. 53) states that there 
should not be a separate rationale for using single case design and for multiple 
case designs, because both are simply different options of the same 
methodological framework. Yin goes on to provide a general rationale for 
choosing a single case design. The first rationale is when the case could be 
regarded as a critical case in testing a theory or a theoretical framework. Here the 
single case is used to test if the theory is true or false. The second rationale 
introduced by Yin is the extreme case design, which involves a rare situation 
where any case has merits. There third rationale, involves a typical case, where 
the case study involves a typical situation. Finally, Yin introduces the revelatory 
case where an opportunity arises to investigate a phenomenon previously 
unavailable (Yin 2009, p. 47-48). 
Here a theoretical framework has been created in order to shed light on a 
particular policy field within the EU. I am most interested in the decisions made 
regarding reforms to the policy field and it will involve ”understanding the 
decision as a whole, examining the process by which it was made, the 
  16 
participants, the consequences etc” (de Vaus 2001, p. 220). Furthermore, the 
rationale for using a case study analysis directly connects to the paper’s research 
question and my choice of theories. The case study design is in my opinion the 
most likely method to provide answers to the research questions of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Material and limitations 
The requirements of what data to use is an important part of any case study. These 
requirements should in the words of George and Bennett “be determined by the 
theoretical framework and the research strategy to be used for achieving the 
study’s research objectives” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 86). Hence, the nature of 
question asked by the researcher will inevitably control the data requirement of 
his or her study. Here, this translates to successfully mapping out certain evolution 
that has taken place in a certain timeframe, by analysing the relevant documents. 
In this paper I will attempt to make use of several different types of data. They 
include official documents; mainly from the relevant EU institutions as well as 
other relevant international organisations. However, the material obtained from 
official sources must always be analysed with a hint of scepticism as the data 
might be distorted for some reason. These documents are created by actors 
involved and often the reader must consume the material with a critical mind as in 
the words of Lindsay Prior, “one set of questions that may quite justifiably be 
asked by the social scientist researcher concern the processes and circumstances 
in term of which document ’X’ has been manufactured” (2003, p. 4). With that in 
mind, when examining documents from the EU institutions one must be aware 
that there might be certain bias involved in said documents where each institution 
attempts to portray a certain reality.  
In order to supplement the official documents, various secondary sources are 
used to assist the argumentation put forth in this paper. This paper analytical 
chapter is largely made up of official documents and secondary literature but does 
not use interviews as I felt there was ample information available from those 
sources. This position is in line with the reasoning of Robert E. Stake who states 
that “we try not to disturb the ordinary activity of the case, not to test, not even to 
interview, if we can get the information we want by discrete observation or 
examination of records” (1995, p. 12). The reason for this is that the paper uses a 
high level of analysis where I am more interested in understanding the policy 
process as a whole. However, future research on this subject might benefit from 
using triangulation in data. Meaning that in order to triangulate causal 
relationships such studies could make use of discursive analysis of interviews 
with key actors, in order to increase the validity of the study (Bache et al. 2012, p. 
80). 
Finally, while this paper examines one specific case, the 2013 reforms and the 
recent evolution of the CFP, the analysis is mostly limited to the basic regulation 
covering the policy field (Regulations 1380/2013, 2371/2002 and 3760/92) and 
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does not look at surrounding regulations relating to the creation of a common 
market with fisheries products nor how the CFP funding schemes have developed 
through the years as these processes are independent of the overall factors causing 
the developments controlling fishing opportunities, conservation of the fisheries 
resource.  
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4 Historical background 
What follows is a short introduction to the background of the CFP, its origins are 
discussed and the different stages of reforms the policy field has undertaken in the 
last decades are introduced. 
 
4.1 Mismanagement within the CFP 
The Common Fisheries Policy is the legal framework that stipulates how the 
Unions fish stocks are managed. Until recently an often cited opinion among 
scholars was that the CFP was regarded as a failure, where politics simply 
mattered more than findings and recommendations of scientists which warned of 
the harmful consequences of the continuation of a destructive policy (Daw & 
Gray 2005, p. 195-196). Among them, Dexter C. Payne indeed claimed in 2000 
that the CFP had been unsuccessful in stemming over-fishing and that “the CFP 
has largely failed in its aim of conserving fishery resources over its 15-year 
history, in spite of its seeming advantages over other functionally similar 
international fisheries institutions” (Payne 2000, p. 304). The reason major 
reforms had fail until recently was said to because vested interest within the 
policy field had resulted in inertia (Daw & Gray 2005, p. 195). Al-Fattal 
maintained in 2009 that the CFP was a prime example of a policy failure, where 
no less than nine community managed types of fishery stock were over exploited. 
Payne attributes this to the “nested institutional context in which the CFP is 
negotiated” (quote in Al-Fattal 2009, p. 546). However, in order to get a clearer 
picture of why the policy field evolved as it did and why the shortcomings 
mentioned above went unaddressed for so long, it is helpful to look back at its 
origins. Below the historical background of the Union’s fisheries policy will be 
examined, the changes to the policy field will be traced and the current situation 
of the CFP will be briefly introduced. 
 
4.2 The establishment of the CFP: 1957-1983 
The issue of fisheries within the EU or as it was called then, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) can be traced back to Article 38 (1) of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. There fisheries are merely mentioned as an agriculture product in 
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the section of agriculture in general and the overriding goal of the agricultural 
policy was to increase food production. Because fisheries were simply any other 
agricultural product, this also applied to fisheries within the EU at the time (Frost 
2010, p. 472-473). However, fisheries are fundamentally different from 
agriculture in an important way as fisheries can be characterised as a common 
good. This means in the words of the EU itself that, “[i]ndividuals operating in 
their own interests tend to overexploit a common pool resource, rivalling others as 
they capture 'their' share. What one fisherman takes today cannot be caught 
tomorrow by another” (European Commission 2011b, p. 2). Hence, the early 
legislation which the fisheries pertained to could be said to have led to the over-
exploitation and little attention was paid to the fact that the resource might be 
depleted. 
In 1970 the EU states or EEC states as they were known then, agreed on the 
establishment of a basic legal framework for the fisheries. This legal framework 
was primarily made up of two regulations, Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/1970 of 
the Council of 20 October 1970 laying down a common structural policy for the 
fishing industry, and Regulation (EEC) No. 2142/1970 of the Council of 20 
October 1970 on the common organisation of the market in fishery product. 
Some, scholars maintain that the reason for the timing of this legislation of 
fisheries was closely tied to the upcoming enlargement of the EEC at the time 
(Pálsson & Stefánsson 2003, p. 15; Lutchman et al. 2009, p. 12). Hence the six 
founding members of the EEC
3
 looked to create a binding legislation regarding 
the EEC’s fisheries before the big fishing nations of Denmark, United Kingdom, 
and Ireland, would join. 
In the late seventies and late eighties events occurred that would influence the 
future development the common fisheries policy within the EU. In 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded after years of 
negotiations. The establishment of a 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ), allowing coastal states sovereign rights to exploit and manage the areas 
living resources would force the EU to act because this meant that member states 
would lose access to some of their traditional fishing areas which would place 
increased pressure on EU fishing stocks (Churchill and Owen 2010, p. 6-7). The 
Commission created a proposal amending the legislation where the member states 
would adopt the 200 nm EEZ’s and all management of fish stocks in EU waters 
would now been overseen at the Union level rather than by the member states 
themselves and losses due to the 200 nautical miles rule would be compensated 
through future Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
4
 allocations which indicates how 
little issues like sustainability mattered at the time (Karagiannakos 1996, p. 235-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 The six founding members of the EEC were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. 
4
 TOCs are catch limits that are set for commercial fish stocks. When distributing the TACs among the member 
states, three points should determine the allocation following the 1992 reforms. Traditional fishing patterns 
within EEC waters, the Hague preferences which gave preferential quotas to fishermen from regions that were 
particularly dependent on fishing and if the fishing industry of a particular member state had lost fishing catch 
due to the 200-mile EEZ change in 1982 (Karagiannakos 1996, p. 235-236). 
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236). Finally, these developments would have structural impact on the EU’s 
fishing fleet which would entail considerable cost. Meaning, that the fleet had to 
be adapted to these changes and that the EEC had to subsidise its fisheries 
(European Commission 1976). The European Council agreed to most aspects of 
the Commission’s proposal, however the transfer of oversight of fisheries 
management to the EU level rather than having it at the member states level was 
more troublesome as some member states desired more quota than a centralised 
system would give to them. It was not until 1983 that the fisheries management 
agreement was reached and again the pressure of further enlargement somewhat 
forced the member states to come to an agreement as the two big Iberian fishing 
states, Portugal and Spain were poised to join the community in the near future 
(Churchill and Owen 2010, p. 8). 
Another significant event in the evolution of fisheries in the EU, was a 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgment in case 804/79 between the United 
Kingdom and the Commission, where the ECJ interpreted the EC treaties to mean 
that the competence to regulate fisheries in EC member states’ belonged rather to 
the institutions of the EU, than the member states themselves (Churchill 1993, p. 
261). Despite this the Commission did not have full authority for enforcement in 
the final regulation as the member states were unified in their opposition against 
the ideas that the Commission would be the party monitoring and enforcing the 
conservation policy. Rather it was allowed only minimal authority while the 
member states were in control of monitoring and enforcement (Payne 2000, p. 
305-306).  
The Common Fisheries Policy was formally established in 1983 and could be 
said to have largely entailed continuation of the already existing rules when it 
came to fisheries management. The regulation was primarily made up of four 
elements (Churchill 1993, p. 261). First, regulation 170/83, established a 
Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources. 
The regulation stated that the EU could limit the TACs and that a Scientific and 
Technical Committee for Fisheries should be created to assist in the formulation 
of TACs and quotas. Second, regulation 172/83 further stated the allocation of 
TACs and national quotas for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks 
occurring in the EU’s fishing zone. Third, regulation 171/83 set certain technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Finally, regulations were 
created that provided aid and subsidies for restructuring of fishing fleets in the 
member states. 
 
4.3 Reforms in the 1990s and 2000s 
The framework described above, allowed the Council to set the quotas and TACs 
each year based on recommendation by the Commission. The Commission’s 
recommendations were based on marine research carried out by scientists within 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) (Daw & Gray 
  21 
2005, p. 190). Somewhat predictably, because of pressure from fisheries industry 
and national lobbying, these quotas and TACs were routinely placed considerably 
higher by the Council than what fisheries scientists would recommend (Churchill 
& Owen 2010, p. 12). Some amendments were made to the system in the coming 
years and in some cases consolidating regulations were created that replaced old 
regulations, but overall this system was in place for a decade, until the 1990’s. 
Again changes were made to the CFP in 1992 and 1993 as a part of a review of 
the CFP. Regulation 3760/92 establishing a Community system laying down rules 
for the minimum information to be contained in fishing licences, replaced 
regulation 170/83. The new regulation contained new rules involving harvesting 
restriction and a system of vessel licensing (Churchill and Owen 2010, p. 15-17).  
In the CFP each regulation change typically called for a review of the policies 
and regulations to take place ten years after the adoption of said regulation. 
Hence, the regulations that took place in the 1990s stipulated a review of the main 
regulations that made up the CFP to take place in the early 2000s. The 
Commission initiated the process and was quite critical of the policy field and 
claimed that major imperfections had to be addressed (Churchill and Owen 2010, 
p. 18). Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and 
sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy 
was issued and replaced regulation 3760/92. The new regulation included some 
amendments to the policy field but in essence the reforms of 2002 were only 
modest, despite some lofty aspirations. The conservation part of the CFP 
remained more or less unchanged despite clear indicators the current scheme of 
TACs and quota recommendations was inadequate and lead to in overexploitation 
of various EU managed fish stocks. Though, certain changes were brought to the 
policy filed but in reality they can only be regarded as being small in scale. 
 
4.4 Reforms in 2013 
In 2007 the CFP came under increased scrutiny when the European Court of 
Auditors (ECA), a European institution which is charged with examining how the 
EU budget is implemented, came to the conclusion that the CFP was severely 
lacking when it came to the implementation of the fisheries policy. Primarily, the 
audit found that the proper functions of the TAC and national quota systems were 
not up to scratch. The policy lacked the necessary tools to provide guarantees that 
possible infringements were being prevented and detected. When infringement 
had taken place the ECA found penalties to have been handed out haphazardly 
and that the relevant EU institutions lacked the instruments to hand out penalties. 
Finally, the ECA found that the policy had failed to prevent overfishing and to 
adapt when it came to change in fishing capacity (European Court of Auditors. 
2007, p. 4). Following the ECA report, the Commission started a process of a 
fundamental revision of the CFP where the main problem with the CFP was 
identified as a lack of environmental sustainability which was attributed to 
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overfishing. Different factors added to this problem, including over capacity of 
the fleet, the ignoring of scientific advice when recommending the TACs to name 
a few. The second issue was the poor economic sustainability, meaning many 
fleets were unprofitable. Third, social sustainability had to be addressed; meaning 
solutions had to be found for rural communities highly dependent on fisheries, 
where jobs in the sector were decreasing. Fourth, the Commission acknowledged 
that the complex decision making procedure of the CFP had to be addressed. 
Finally, the external aspects of the CFP had to some extent failed (European 
Commission 2011a, p. 1). 
The Commission particularly highlighted the importance of achieving 
environmental sustainability within the CFP. This could be done by setting TACs 
and quotas based on maximum sustainable yield (MSY), meaning that catch taken 
from any fish stock over a specific period is done so without harming it. Annual 
TACs and quotas would furthermore be based on scientific advice which should 
lead to healthier stocks and less undersized fish which again would mean less 
discarding (European Commission 2009, p. 5-7). The rationale behind MSY was 
not particularly new as it was first included in the UNCLOS convention in 1982, 
and would be committed to by the EU and its member states in two successive 
Earth Summits in 1992 and 2002 where they agreed to bring fish stocks to levels 
compatible with the standard of MSY no later than 2015 (Salomon & Holm-
Müller 2012, p. 627). Alongside having recommendations based on MSY the 
member states were expected to harmonise data collection and increase scientific 
research in the area with increased funding (European Commission 2009, p. 20). 
One of the major criticisms put forth in the report by ECA was the lack of 
enforcing tools in the CFP. Though the European Fisheries Control Agency was 
set up in 2005 to handle control and inspections, it had not been very efficient in 
tackling the matter and member states generally had the task of monitoring their 
own fishermen. The funding of the CFP is stipulated in Council Regulation (EC) 
1198/06 on the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and relates to the various 
structural aspects involved in the CFP. There are considerable amounts spent on 
the EFF as approximately €4305 million were estimated to projects under the EFF 
between 2007 and 2013 (Markus 2010, p. 1119).   
In the end reforms to the policy field were agreed to, after laborious 
negotiations stretching over three years. Two regulations were created, Regulation 
(EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Common Fisheries Policy, generally referred to as the basic regulation on 
fisheries, and Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture 
products, referred to as the market regulation. For the purposes of this paper the 
focus is one the former regulation rather than the latter. Article 15 of Regulation 
1380/2013 states that an end is to be put to the wasteful practices of fish 
discharges. When unwanted catches will occur only specific species are permitted 
to be discarded, according to the most reliable scientific advice on species that 
have a high survival rate when released into the sea. When this does not apply, a 
landing obligation will apply, meaning that the vessel will have to land it with the 
rest of the catch. Furthermore, Article 16 states that TACs and quota 
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recommendation will in future be based on MSY, but fishing opportunities can be 
arranged by the Council only when the scientific evidence behind those 
opportunities has clearly changed. 
An important aspect of the reformed policy is an increased commitment to 
sustainable fishing by means of a multiannual plan where MSY is applied as 
stipulated in the policy. This will not only stop overfishing but rebuild fish stocks 
by 2015 for some stocks and as a rule for all stock in 2020. A third important 
change in the reformed policy is the introduction of a decentralized decision 
making through regionalisation. Here Article 18 grants the member states the right 
to put into practice measures better fitting to their own fisheries. Here the 
multiannual plans for a specific stock member states are allowed to set national 
measures to control the stocks at a sustainable level together with the relevant 
stakeholders. The Commission will only get involved is for some reason the 
member states are unable to reach an agreement regarding stock 
recommendations. Article 22 of the reforms saw the creation of maximum fleet 
capacity ceilings and each member state is to be responsible for ensuring that 
fishing vessels are proportionate with available fishery resources. New vessels 
could only be introduced when older ones were scraped. 
Overall, this was a dramatic jump forward and put environmental issues and 
sustainable development at the forefront of the policy. How was such a 
fundamental change possible? In the following analysis chapter I will attempt to 
explain the necessary factors in the 2013 CFP reforms. 
  24 
5 Empirical analysis 
The following chapter offers the paper’s analysis of the events leading up to the 
latest reform of the Common Fisheries Policy which came into force in 2014. The 
argument put forth in this paper stipulates that the latest reforms cannot be viewed 
in isolation but rather that a historical perspective is necessary and hence two 
earlier CFP reforms are examined along with the latest reforms in an attempt to 
understand how the recent fundamental reforms came about. The analytical 
chapter is made up of several sub-chapters which when viewed together offer 
explanations for the development of the policy field using punctuated equilibrium 
theory, path dependency and the policy window approach as analytical tools. 
 
5.1 The UN Earth Summits 
In order to fully understand some of the changes to the CFP which were a part of 
the 2013 reform package, a historical perspective is needed. In fact, this paper 
states that in order to understand the recent evolution of the policy field, external 
pressures to the EU relating to environmental issues within the structure of the 
United Nations in the 1990s and early 2000s must be addressed. The importance 
of environmental issues has been increasing slowly and surely within international 
politics for several decades. With regards to the EU, the issue has been a part of 
the Union’s agenda for little over a half a century as the fact that environmental 
issues are a matter well suitable to be tackled within international institutions due 
to the fact that environmental threats do not abide to national boarders but must 
rather be addressed internationally (Carter 2007, p. 242). In fact, in the EU 
context, environmental issues inherently have spillover effects when it comes to 
other policy fields as “many complex environmental issues have a significant 
international dimension that forces the EU policy process to interact with other 
political structures and actors” (Kellow & Zito 2002, p. 44). This stems from the 
fact that in order to reach goals set in order to safeguard the environment other 
policy areas would inevitably be affected as a cut in carbon dioxide emissions is 
also an economic issue and similarly new rules intended to preserve fish stock 
will certainly also impact the fisheries policy. 
In the late 1980s environmental issues became increasingly prominent on the 
international scene and the issue was ever more being framed as being about 
ensuring sustainable development - meaning that the goal should be to ensure that 
the earth and the environment should be returned to future generations in similar 
condition as current generations had received them and that societal factors should 
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be increasingly connected to environmental protection. Therefore, sustainable 
development would more or less become a key theme of the UN Earth summit in 
Rio which was to be held in 1992 (Vogler 2011, p. 356-357). There, negotiations 
were to take place on issues connected to the environment, such as climate 
change, emissions and energy policy to name just a few. At the time this issue 
area was a little uncomfortable for the EU as the running of several policy areas, 
such as the CAP and the CFP, was anything but environmentally friendly (Vogler 
2011, p. 356). Still the EU had ambitions to change this and the Earth Summit in 
Rio would become the first steps towards the EU becoming a real power in the 
area of environmental protection worldwide. 
In the build-up to the Earth Summit in Rio there had been some discussion 
about what the role of the EU in the UN negotiations should be. As the EU’s 
member states were already present in the negotiations some saw the European 
countries as trying to secure more voting leverage by also having the EU present. 
In the end a compromise was reached where the EU was allowed to be percent in 
the discussions and have many of the same rights as the sovereign states had, 
however it would have no voting rights (Lightfoot & Burchell 2004, p. 338). In 
the negotiations the dual representation of the EU member states through national 
delegations on one hand, and through the EU Commission was a little complex. 
The Commission represented the EU in the negotiation in areas of exclusive 
competences, negotiating at its behalf and presenting its standpoints (Gstöhl 2008, 
p.19). In the negotiations the EU would take the stance of an environment 
protection entrepreneur, highlighting issues such as climate change, dangers to the 
ozone and the importance of biodiversity. Though the Rio Summit did not bring 
about the change in environment degradation many had hoped it would, the 
summit certainly created a new role for the EU at the forefront of environmental 
issues (Cihelková & Krc 2008, p. 37). However, as the EU was creating the 
internal market around the same time as these developments occurred, 
environmental issues were sure to increasingly influence the various policy areas 
of the EU. In fact, this was acknowledged by the EU in a report back in the 1990s, 
where the imminent completion of the internal market would require 
environmental issues to be integrated into the various policy areas (CEC 1993, p. 
98). 
The Rio conference in 1992 was attended by representatives from over 170 
nations and numerous NGOs to discuss various environmental issues including 
climate change, fossil fuel consumption, and scarcity of water to name just a few. 
One of the summit’s agreements was the Agenda 21 action plan, a non-binding 
agreement where the parties involved looked to implement the plans objectives 
into force. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 was devoted to protection of the oceans and 
was intended to build on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 (UNCLOS) which the EU was a contracting party to, but the 
general wording of the agreement has been criticized for allowing “economic and 
social objectives being given a higher weighting than environmental objectives” 
(Proelss & Houghton 2012, p. 24). The chapter set “forth rights and obligations of 
States and provides the international basis upon which to pursue the protection 
and sustainable development of the marine and coastal environment and its 
  26 
resources” (United Nations 1992, p. 238). Various issues regarding the oceans 
were highlighted, they included improved management and sustainable 
development, the importance of sustainable exploitation and conservation of 
marine living (United Nations 1992, p. 238). A particular programme area of the 
chapter on oceans centred on sustainable use and conservation of marine living 
resources of the high seas was particularly applicable to the EU as large part of its 
fisheries fell into that category. The report lists the problem as being that “[t]here 
are problems of unregulated fishing, overcapitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel 
reflagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases 
and lack of sufficient cooperation between States (United Nations 1992, p. 252). 
This picture drawn by the UN report was quite bleak when it came to fisheries and 
mirrored the state of affairs in EU waters at the time. 
The report recommends that the parties involved start using a new 
measurement for its stocks recommendation system, the system of maximum 
yields (MSY) The idea behind the MSY is that the fish stock is exploited to such a 
point that it is always allowed to regenerate and make possible the highest 
possible harvest for the indefinite future. This system is more or less unique for 
each fish species meaning the MSY must therefore be calculated separately for 
each species (Rudolph 2008, p. 195-196). Furthermore, fishing gear should be 
used that is selective when it comes to the structure of the catch, highlighting the 
importance of limiting discards and management and enforcement should be 
increased. Discards were a considerable problem in fisheries at the time of the 
report as fishermen would routinely catch unwanted stocks of fish in their catches 
which they would simply discard into the see again. When it came to management 
and enforcement many areas lacked infrastructure and instruments to enforce the 
quota recommendations and to ensure fishing bans were being adhered to. The 
report also called for more scientific measure when it came to the quota 
management and where such infrastructure was lacking, measures should be taken 
to improve technical and research programmes in order for decision maker to have 
more reliable figures when issuing quota and catches (United Nations 1992, p. 
252-256). Principle 15 of the UN declaration highlights the importance of 
precautionary principle and states “[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” 
(United Nations 1992, p. 6). 
Representatives from all twelve EU member states were present and agreed to 
the Agenda 21 declaration
5
 and the EU itself had used its participant status 
effectively to lobby for a position that supported sustainable development as a 
norm. However, the declaration signed in Rio was non-binding and as such it did 
not oblige the EU or its member states to use the measurement of MSY when 
recommending stocks or to follow sustainable exploitation, following the Rio 
summit. That commitment did however come in 2002 following the Earth Summit 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK all agreed to the proposal. 
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in Johannesburg in 2002. There article 31 states “[m]aintain or restore stocks to 
levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield with the aim of achieving 
these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent basis and where possible not later 
than 2015” (United Nations 2002, p. 23). Furthermore, to “[p]romote the 
implementation of chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which provides the programme of 
action for achieving the sustainable development of oceans, coastal areas and seas 
[...]” (United Nations 2002, p. 22). Here the relevant parties committed 
themselves to reaching the targets set out in Agenda 21 declaration of the Rio 
Summit a decade earlier. By committing to the goals set out in the declaration at 
the Johannesburg summit, the EU added considerable political weight to 
responsible fisheries as now the goals set out in the deceleration had to be 
implemented somehow by the EU which was increasingly ambitious when it came 
to environmental issues on the world scene (Froese & Proelß 2010, p. 195). 
However, the Agenda 21 declaration would stand as a reminder of just how 
substandard the conservation methods of the CFP were for years to come and little 
progress was made initially to reform the CFP.  
 
5.1.1 UN Earth Summits punctuating CFP equilibrium 
A seemingly incremental change happened when the EU and its member states 
signed up to Agenda 21 in Rio in 1992 and later committed to in Johannesburg a 
decade years later. However, the declaration’s focus on environmental protection 
and sustainable development would influence the EU in various ways. However, 
the focus of this paper is on the CFP specifically and how the signing of an 
international agreement on the environment would, by advocating a stock 
recommendation measurement based on responsible exploitation and a call to 
achieve sustainable development, punctuate the equilibrium of a stagnated and 
somewhat wasteful policy field. The theory seems to fit neatly to the events that 
are described here above, where external supporting mechanises can cause 
considerable shifts in a policy subsystem. Here the external mechanism being the 
Earth Summit and the policy subsystem being the CFP.  
John Vogler states that once environmental issues started to be framed in line 
with sustainable development following Rio in 1992 it became unavoidable that 
the various EU policy fields would be affected (Vogler 2011, p. 356). There was 
increased attention to these issues in the Treaties while the CFP can be said to 
have struggled to follow these developments which led to lack in policy 
coherence. However, the policy field would slowly and surely catch up with other 
developments. As discussed in the background chapter above, from the time that 
the first legislation was created around EU fisheries in 1970, until the nineties, the 
policy field was best described as involving incremental change and inertia, where 
fishing opportunities were awarded haphazardly. The Council routinely set the 
fishing quotas and TAC recommendations substantially higher than the levels 
recommended by the Commission on advice from marine scientists, often due to 
national pressure. Fish discards were a huge problem and enforcement of the 
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actual legislation was poor (Churchill & Owen 2010, p. 12). This inevitably led to 
the overexploitation of the resource and valuable fish stocks came close to a 
collapse (Daw & Gray 2005, p. 190). These problems were for all to see, but there 
seemed to be little possibility that the forces of change would come from within 
the policy field and throughout the years the policy instruments did not change in 
any real way. When the EU decided to pursue an active role at the UN Earth 
summits in 1992 and 2002 it was clear the environmental issues would infuse the 
various EU policy process as a result. Various EU documents, particularly those 
from institutions which called for change to the CFP, referred to the binding 
commitment made in Johannesburg in 2002 when calling for the policy field to 
bring about more sustainable and responsible policy tools. Hence, the Rio summit 
and the subsequent Johannesburg summit, acted as an external shock to the CFP, 
rupturing the very fabric of the policy field. The negative feedback within the CFP 
where change was difficult and complex was stopped and by agreeing to certain 
‘greening’ aspects to the CFP, constraints were place on those within the policy 
field which were inescapable. 
Furthermore, as discussed above in the theory chapter, punctuated equilibrium 
theory makes use of policy images of the policy process. When a policy only has 
one policy image the likelihood of change is quite limited. However, when a 
competing policy image is introduced, the possibility of change greatly increases. 
This was precisely what occurred in connection to the CFP when a new policy 
image appeared, the environmental policy image. Admittedly, the concept of 
environmental protection did not begin with the Earth Summits, but my reasoning 
is that following them, the issue became much more pressing within the CFP. 
Here, the policy had traditionally centred on economic factors and to some extent 
these economic factors were coupled to food production. But after the Rio 
Summit environmental issues were higher on the agenda and the two summits 
discussed above would legitimate the environmental policy image into the actual 
policy process allowing for new ideas and thus helping to disrupt a stagnated 
policy field and usher in the possibility for actual change. Furthermore, the new 
policy image would allow policy entrepreneurs to frame CFP issues closer to 
sustainable development making reforms more feasible.  
 
5.2 Reforms in 1992 
As is stated in this paper’s background chapter, the CFP only changed 
incrementally up to the 1992 policy reforms and the policy field was generally 
viewed as being wasteful and depleting the oceans of various species. The CFP 
was a policy field in many ways characterized by nestled policy making, where 
the internal functioning’s of a policy field obstructed possible agreements on more 
effective policies (Payne 2000, p. 307-308). However, the rationale of this paper 
is that environmental negotiations outside the policy field disrupted the stasis of 
the policy field allowing for change. 
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The 1992 reforms were the first review of the CFP and took place the same 
year as the Earth Summit in Rio but then already environmental issues were 
increasingly prominent within EU as sustainable development was the central 
theme of the Environmental Action Programme being promoted by the 
Commission that year (Collier 1997, p. 4). Hence, the whole early nineties review 
of the CFP took place to the backdrop where environmental issues could not be 
escaped. The process of reviewing the CFP went back to 1991 when the 
Commission presented some general analysis of the CFP, rather than concrete 
proposals, in a report to the Council and the EP. The report was quite critical of 
the CFP, highlighting some of its deficiencies. These included bringing attention 
to the over-exploitation of various stocks and called for improved resource 
management and conservation policy within the CFP. Here the Commission 
reasoning is based both on socio-economic factors and also a biological approach 
(European Commission 1991a, p. iii-v). The report also called for a system of 
catches that would “maintain or restore stocks of harvested species at levels which 
can produce the maximum sustainable yield” (European Commission 1991b, p. 
8). Here the Commission was clearly attempting to play the role of a policy 
entrepreneur attempting to rectify shortcomings to CFP policy and offering 
solutions.  
In the end of 1992 Regulation 3760/92 was adopted which repelled and 
replaced Regulation 170/83. In the new regulation, the objectives of the CFP were 
for the first time spelled out in a detailed way. They highlighted points such as 
protection, conservation and sustainability, but referred to economic efficiency in 
a lesser degree, and did not mention specific exceptions regarding fishing in poor 
regions more dependent on fishing as in the previous regulation (Churchill 1993, 
p. 266). This indicates that there was less tolerance for inefficient CFP policy 
justified on the grounds of socioeconomic handouts. In Regulation 3760/92, there 
were clear indications that the policy image monopoly was under increased 
pressure as environmental language was becoming increasingly prominent in 
official legal documents. While Regulation 170/83 used the term conservation in 
rather vague and general terms, Regulation 3760/92, Article 2 (2) states that “[t]o 
that end, and in order to ensure sustainable exploitation activities, this Regulation 
establishes a framework for the regulation of access, management and monitoring 
of exploitation activities, as well as the requisite means and procedures.” Here the 
new regulation made use of the term sustainable development which is a much 
more decided term. Indeed in only a few years after its introduction in the 1980s it 
became a central term in discussion on policy making and environmental issues 
(Bruyninckx 2006, p. 265). 
Article 4 of the new regulation stated that the Council determined the TACs 
and quotas by qualified majority and stated that following scientific advice is not 
required but rather optional. The article in question highlighted several measures 
that the Council could use in order to achieve the goals of the regulation, such as 
limiting catches, limiting time at sea and various other steps available to the 
Council, should it feel the goals of the regulation were not being met. This is 
understandable as at the time the fishing fleet of the EU was considerably larger 
than the fishing opportunities called for, thus meaning fewer vessels could go to 
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sea each time. This part of the regulation was more or less identical to the 
previous regulation and the member states through their Council activities still 
were in control of quota management. While, the Council had a multitude of tools 
to combat harmful practices related to the CFP, it newer made use of these tools 
when problems arouse within the policy field (Hegland & Raakjær 2008, p. 146). 
However, in response to criticism put forth by the Commission in its 1991 report 
on the CFP, Regulation 2847/93 which established a control system for the CFP 
was agreed to in 1993 which looked to create an effective system of control 
regarding the policy field in general. This regulation gave the Commission certain 
oversight when it came to national monitoring of the policy and it even meant that 
satellite surveillance could be used to monitor fishing efforts (Hegland & Raakjær 
2008, p. 147). This is another example of how the Commission was gaining 
increasing powers within the policy field. The new regulation also acknowledged 
the increased role of the EP which under Article 43 of the EEC Treaty had 
acquired a consultative role in the EU decision making procedure when it came to 
the CFP. While the powers of the EP were still quite limited, following the 
changes it would have an official role in future reform procedures.  
 
5.2.1 The 1992 CFP reforms as a critical juncture  
Generally the 1992 CFP reform did not bring about the fundamental change to the 
policy field that the Commission had envisaged and the ministers within the 
Council of Ministers saw little reason to bring about any significant changes to the 
CFP despite various warning signs. The reform did little to end the 
overexploitation of the resource and the wasteful practices of discards, as national 
governments were still in the driving seat when it came to quota management, 
through the Council where the relevant ministers of the member states were 
seated, essentially meaning that national politicians were making the decisions. 
These democratically elected ministers are by definition most occupied with 
taking the right decisions in order to secure their party’s and their own re-election 
(Daw & Gray 2004, p. 191). Hence, it is very questionable whether these 
individuals will make decisions that secure sustainability of an resource which 
might not materialize until decades later. Indeed, through the use of the 
Regulation 3760/92 the Council would rather ensure generous fishing quotas for 
the member states than side with those who campaigned for environmental issues 
and the sustainable use of the fisheries resource.  
Despite the fact that the reform might individually be regarded as being 
disappointing in bringing about fundamental change to an inefficient policy field, 
the reform itself ended the negative feedback which the CFP had been stuck in 
since its inception. The reform through its emphasis on sustainable development 
created a positive feedback and by deciding to apply various environmental goals 
and use concepts agreed to at Rio a critical juncture occurred which would have 
repercussions for future policy makers as the option not to go green was now 
much more difficult to revert to as the cost of exit became too high. This was 
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possible due to the impact the Rio Summit had on the CFP, a competing policy 
image had arisen, the environmental policy image, breaking the policy image 
monopoly, allowing the Commission to frame the CFP more according to 
environmental issues. Furthermore, it seems clear that the critical juncture which 
is represented in the 1992 reform was “followed by a more constrained choice-set 
once reinforcement sets in” (Pierson 2000a, p. 75). By choosing to pursue a 
greener policy instead of continuing down the same route as the policy field had 
been would lead the policy down a specific path where reinforcements or positive 
feedbacks would continue. 
 
5.3 Reforms in 2002 
As stipulated in Article 14(2) of Council Regulation No 3760/92, a deadline was 
set for the review of the 1992 changes to the policy field and the effectiveness of 
the package was to be analysed. Hence, in 2001 the Commission which at the time 
was headed by the Austrian Franz Fischler, issued two documents reviewing the 
CFP, the Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2001, and 
Communication from the Commission on the reform of the Common Fisheries 
Policy – Roadmap in 2002 (European Commission, 2002). Here the Commission 
highlighted the need for changes to the policy field and that the “policy has not 
delivered sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources and will need to be 
changed if it is to do so. Its shortcomings can be expressed in conservation, 
economic and political terms” (European Commission 2001, p. 4). It was 
acknowledged that stocks were overexploited, catch limits had exceeded 
recommendations and proper enforcement of the regulations in place was lacking. 
However, the paper maintained that the policy reforms had not been a total failure 
as it had somewhat stemmed the tide and adverted the complete collapse of 
certain stock in EU waters and stabilised the EU fisheries industry (European 
Commission 2001, p. 4-5). Among the improvements suggested was the increased 
involvement of stakeholders through participation in a network of Regional 
Advisory Councils (RAC) on fisheries, where the voices of diverse groups would 
be heard such as fishermen, industry representatives, environmental NGOs, and 
fisheries biologists to name a few and the Commission also called for increased 
scientific advice into the decision-making process (European Commission 2001, 
p. 28-29).  
The paper discussed the objectives of the CFP and the legal requirements 
faced by it. At the time the CFP did not have a specific chapter in the Treaty but 
fell under Article 33 of Treaty establishing the European Community, on the CAP 
where the main goals are to increase productivity, availability of supplies at a fair 
price while ensuring a fair standard of living for those involved in the industry. 
However, Article 6 of the Treaty called for environmental protection requirements 
to be a consideration in EU policies at the time and this too applied to the CFP. 
Other requirements also involved consumer protection and the protection of 
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marine aquatic resources (European Commission 2001, p. 5-6). Therefore, the 
Commission had to combine environmental protection, the increase of production, 
the right supply at a fair price while minding for socio-economic factors, in a 
single legislation. However, the Commission’s Green Paper states that more 
should be done to integrate an environmental dimension into the CFP and that a 
“balance has to be struck between environmental and fisheries interests” 
(European Commission 2001, p. 9). Here, the Commission headed by Fischler 
again acts as a policy entrepreneur, emphasizing the shortcomings of the policy, 
calling for ratifications to the policy in question and framing the issue prominently 
in terms of the environment. 
Following the establishment of the consultation procedure introduced via 
Article 43 of the EEC Treaty, the EP now had a role to play in the reform 
procedure and the EP’s Committee on Fisheries in which Rosa Miguélez Ramos 
held the position of Rapporteur, would consider the Commission’s Green Paper 
and issue an opinion on it on 20 December 2001 (European Parliament 2001, p. 
4). In the report the EP’s position was to be even more adamant in its opinion on 
the need for reforms to the CFP and even felt the Commission’s Green Paper was 
not progressive enough. The Ramos’s report called for a thorough revision of the 
CFP in light of the challenges it faced but argued that the Green Paper was short 
on solutions to the problems the policy field faced. The report goes on to say “it is 
not a Green Paper for the reform of the CFP but for its continuation, without 
making any substantial changes to a policy which has attracted so much criticism” 
(European Parliament 2001, p. 24). Furthermore, the EP felt the Green Paper 
failed in creating legislation which combined fishing activities and the protection 
of the environment. The Commission’s goals of reducing fleet capacity were 
deemed unrealistic due to lack of cooperation from member states and that the 
system of controls and penalties should rather be at Union level rather than at 
member state level (European Parliament 2001, p. 24-25). The EP then laid out its 
own ideas for the new CFP. These included the establishment of a single EU fleet, 
where vessels sailed under the European flag rather than individual member states 
flags, where there is a single market for fisheries resources. The CFP should look 
to maintain the socio-economic fabric of coastal areas and the EP called for 
rational management of resources through improved system of TACs and quotas 
and by adapting the fleet to the state of stocks. The socio-economic challenges of 
the people in the fishing industry had to be addressed and for increased research 
with the establishment of research centre for the marine environment (European 
Parliament 2001, p. 26-29). The Ramos report though did not call for unrealistic 
or overly radical change. It did not mention a discard ban, but merely called for a 
reduction in discards. It called for more research, the increased application of 
precautionary principal and general improvements to the EU’s fisheries 
management. Here, the Commission had an ally and the EP acts an avid yet a 
responsible environmental proponent. 
The Council did not have a unified position when it came to the Commission’s 
proposal. France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain formed an informal 
group called Amis de la Pêche (AdlP) within the Council to guard against what 
these member states felt was an excessive emphasis of conservation in the 
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Commission’s proposals. They maintained that socio-economic aspects should be 
the key point of the CFP. In the first set of proposals issued by the Commission, 
aid to the building of new vessels gave way to subsidies for the scrapping of 
vessels. The AdlP group objected to these proposals and after laborious 
negotiations an agreement was done where public aid was to be phased out over a 
two year period and subsidies for small and medium-sized vessels would still be 
permitted in some cases. In the end Finland, the UK and the Netherlands joined 
the AdlP group and voted for what would become Council Regulation (EC) No 
2369/2002 regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector, but 
Sweden and Germany voted against the proposal meaning that the Council did not 
vote unanimously (Schweiger 2010, p. 59-60). With regards to the basic 
regulation, the Commission’s proposals had intended the responsibility for setting 
the TACs to be transferred from the Council to the Commission and its 
Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture after a year of transition but this did not 
materialise. While the Commission’s proposal had proposed that quotas should be 
based on scientific opinion, Council Regulation 2371/2002 stated that this 
scientific opinion was only to be taken into account when recommending TACs 
and quotas. This left the Council in charge of setting these recommendations 
meaning that the Commission in fact failed in transforming the way quota 
management were set, leaving the member states still in control (Schweiger 2010, 
p. 61-62). 
On December 20
th
 2002 Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation 
and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries 
Policy was agreed to by the Council. The policy outcome could be said to have 
been somewhat underwhelming as the reforms were in no way the thorough 
revision of the CFP the EP had advocated in its report. The system of TACs and 
quotas was more or less left unchanged with the Council in charge of setting 
fishing limits in accordance with Article 4 of the regulation. Article 23 stated that 
the member states were charged with the task of ensuring effective control, 
inspection and enforcement of the rules of the CFP just as had been the case in the 
1992 regulation and had been criticised in the EP’s report for failing to ensure a 
level playing field across the Union (European Parliament 2001, p. 14).  
However the objectives of the regulation could be regarded as giving hope for 
the advocates of environmental issues within the CFP. Article 2 of the regulation 
states that the exploitation of living aquatic resources shall ensure sustainable 
economic, environmental and social aspects and that the precautionary approach 
could be applied in order to ensure sustainable exploitation of the fisheries 
resource. Here, the Union, committed to using the fisheries resource in a 
sustainable way and that it had to be mindful of the possible negative impact of 
the exploitation. The introduction of the precautionary approach connects to the 
Rio Declaration from 1992, but Principle 15 of the 1992 UN declaration called on 
those involved to apply the precautionary principle when possible and the 
principle was being applied to ever more areas within the EU. Furthermore Article 
2 called for an ecosystem-based approach to be adopted meaning “seeking to 
promote the sustainable use of the seas and the conservation of marine 
ecosystems” (Wakefield 2012, p. 3). Articles 31 and 32 of the regulation 
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established the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) which were primarily made 
up of fishermen and representatives of the relevant interests, being from fisheries 
and aquaculture sector, scientific experts, representing consumers to name some, 
but all sharing an interest in EU fisheries. This was seen as part of decentralising 
the policy field and increasing stakeholder participation in the CFP. Furthermore, 
the RACs were as their name implies, only advisory and the EU’s institutions 
were in no way obligated to listen to their advice (Symes 2012, p. 9). However, 
the RAC introduction did mean more diverse voices were heard within the CFP.  
Articles 26 and 27 of Regulation 2371/2002 gave the Commission increased 
powers when it came to evaluation and control within the regulation. Using these 
powers the Commission would take action before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) against member states deemed to be in breach of the rules of the regulation 
(Proelss & Houghton 2012, p. 25). Article 13 of the Regulation created the 
entry/exit scheme which meant that EU member states fleets could not grow 
larger than they were in 1 January 2003. This essentially meant that the entry of 
new capacity into the fleet had to be compensated by the withdrawal of an 
existing one.  
 
5.3.1  The 2002 CFP reforms as a critical juncture  
There is an evident a fairly obvious linkage between the 1992 reforms and the 
2002 reforms as the inclusion of the precautionary approach in ensuring 
sustainable exploitation can be regarded as direct feedback effect of the 1992 
reforms, allowing for the increasing significance of environmental issues within 
the CFP. By applying the precautionary principle within the CFP the EU’s 
institution had to find “the correct balance so that the proportionate, non-
discriminatory, transparent and coherent actions can be taken, requires a 
structured decision-making process with detailed scientific and other objective 
information” (European Commission 2000, p.3). By failing to ensure the fisheries 
resource is exploited in a sustainable way through quota management, and failing 
to reach MSY, the EU institutions were likely in breach of their environmental 
responsibilities contained in the Treaties (Proelss & Houghton 2012, p. 26).  
Just like the 1992 reform, I claim that decisions taken during negotiations on 
the 2002 reforms by EU decision makers represent a critical juncture. By deciding 
on pursuing goals of sustainable development such as the precautionary approach 
in the new regulation, instead of following the voices of those who felt that 
excessive emphasis was being placed on conservation within the CFP, the path 
towards greener policy was further reinforced. While voices within the Council 
called for less emphasis on conservation, previous decisions of 1992 placed 
constrains on policy makers making it almost impossible to turn away from the 
goals of sustainable development. In fact, more diverse voices sounded because of 
the RACs and the increased commitment to sustainable development and 
obligation to the precautionary principle would simply serve to further the 
environmental dimension of the CFP and I claim that decisions made in the 1992 
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reforms were reinforced in 2002 which is a clear example of positive feedback. 
However the 2002 reforms should also be regarded as a critical juncture because 
of choices taken by decision makers at the time would constrain future decision 
makers and the positive feedback loop continued. 
 
5.4 Reforms in 2013 
Just as had been the case previously, Regulation 2371/2002 called for a review of 
the CFP in ten year time, or before the end of 2012. Hence, the review process 
began in 2009 when the Commission issued a Green Paper for the CFP where it 
points out that the CFP has a long way to go before the optimal conditions are 
reached. In the Green Paper, the Commission maintained that this could only 
happen if fundamental reforms took place within the CFP. While the 2002 
reforms were an improvement, they had failed to bring about sustainable fisheries 
in EU waters and at the time the Green Paper was issued 88 % of Community 
stocks were exploited beyond MSY (European Commission 2009a, p. 4-5 and 7). 
This was fundamentally because of overfishing caused by inadequate quota 
management tools in the regulation. Among the ratifications proposed by the 
Commission were clearer policy objectives and for the decision making 
framework to focus on long term objectives rather than short ones. Furthermore, 
the Commission called for MSY to become the “principle for stock management 
in the future CFP” (European Commission 2009a, p. 15). The Commission called 
on stakeholders, the public and all interested parties to comment on the Green 
Paper and to put forth their views on the future of the CFP. In 2011 the 
Commission produced a proposal based on opinions gathered for the new CFP 
regulation in accordance with new procedural rules ushered in by the signing of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Now the ordinary legislative procedure applied to numerous 
policy areas, including the CAP and CFP (Shackleton 2012, p. 130). This meant 
that now the EP was more or less on equal footing with the Council as a co-
legislator in EU decision making and its powers had greatly increased from the 
time it could only issue a non-binding opinion on policy proposals. The 
Commission still initiated the policy process but overall its influence had 
decreased as the EP became more powerful (Young 2010, p. 60-61).  
Preparation for the 2013 reforms by Commission officials can be traced back 
to 2006, when Joe Borg was responsible for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs in the 
Commission and it adopted a Communication on implementing sustainability in 
EU fisheries through Maximum Sustainable Yield which was an evaluation for all 
the MSY long term plans needed to achieve the commitment the member states 
agreed to at the Earth Summit in 2002 in Johannesburg (European Commission 
2006, p. 3). Again, evidence of the punctuating equilibrium events at the two 
Earth Summits was evident within the policy field. Borg highlighted the need for 
a fundamental reform in a speech to the German Bundestag in 2009 where he 
stated that “[a]lmost 9 out of 10 stocks are overfished, and although some stocks 
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have seen improvements, sustainable fisheries are a great distance away from 
being a reality. We have a European fleet with the capacity to fish two to three 
times what would be considered sustainable [...]” (Borg 2009b). Here it is evident 
that sustainable fisheries are the goal of the new policy. However, the 
commissioner for fisheries which would lead the Commission during the reform 
negotiations was Maria Damanaki and in the Commission’s proposal, it called for 
a fundamental reform of the CFP as the 2002 reforms did not achieve sustainable 
fisheries.  
The Commission stated that it had received numerous contributions which 
were considered in the creation of the proposal. The Commission’s proposal 
identifies the single most important objective of the CFP as being to ensure long 
term environmental sustainability to the policy field (European Commission 2011, 
p. 2). This, the Commission stated was a fundamental prerequisite in order to 
bring about economically and socially sustainable fishing industry that would end 
the continued overfishing that has plagued the policy field for so long. An integral 
part of the 2013 reforms was to achieve the goals of MSY for depleted stocks no 
later than 2015, thus abolishing overfishing and taking important steps towards 
eliminating the overcapacity of EU fleet. The Commission’s proposal called for 
the introduction of a system of transferable fishing rights that would help 
eliminate overcapacity and strengthen the economic aspects of the fishing 
industry. Stocks were to be set at levels that would produce MSY levels and an 
obligation to land all catches of certain stocks was to be introduced. No longer 
would the Council set the TACs and quotas but rather a decentralised system 
where member states decided on and adopted the relevant measures and the 
Commission would come in when member states could not agree on targets 
(European Commission 2011a, p. 7). Here, just as in the 2002 reforms, the 
Commission created an ambitious reform package and familiar aspects were 
highlighted for reform. Environmental issues were quite prominent in the 
Commission’s documents. Issues were framed in line with the environmental 
policy image, as in 2002. However, now a new actor, the EP now had a more 
prominent role than before and perhaps now was a chance to usher in a grander 
reform than before as had already been evident when the EP had aligned with the 
Commission earlier in issues of fisheries. In 2009 the EP supported the 
Commission’s proposal for rules on implementation and enforcement of the CFP 
(European Commission 2009b). 
The EP appointed Ulrike Rodust from Germany as rapporteur for the 
Commission’s proposal which headed the negotiations on the behalf of the EP. In 
February 2013, the EP issued its position following the first reading on 6 February 
2013. The EP’s position highlighted the importance of achieving MSY and stated 
that by 2015, fishing mortality rates should be set at levels that would allow 
populations of harvested fish stocks to recover and by 2020 to be above levels that 
are capable of producing MSY (European Parliament 2013a, p. 76). In fact the EP 
went as far as to call for stocks being able to grow beyond sustainable levels in an 
effort to create a safety margin for the environment and thus ensuring the 
precautionary principle is met. The EP called for MSY as not only to be a political 
goal but rather to be legally binding on all future decisions of the CFP and it 
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called for a reduction in the EU fleet (European Parliament 2013b, p. 7-8). The EP 
also called for a full ban on discards and fishermen would be obligated to land all 
catches of managed stocks and that member states would be free to establish 
systems of transferable fishing concessions. The EP called for an increase in 
regionalised approaches towards the governance of the CFP more or less in line 
with the Commission’s proposal (European Parliament 2013a, p. 17-24). In the 
end, the EP voted by a considerable majority in favour of an in depth reform of 
the CFP, rather than a more modest one, which left the Council faced with the 
reality that for any reforms to take place, it would need to meet the EP’s demands 
for noticeable change (Agritrade 2013). Overall, the position taken up by the EP 
was one of calling for radical change to the CFP. It took a strong stance with the 
application of MSY, for the banning of discards and alongside sustainable 
development. The policy image more strongly portrayed in the EP’s position on 
the CFP is environmental in nature rather than economic. 
The Council’s position as a decision maker had changed considerably from the 
previous CFP reforms as it was no longer the main actor but now it shared the 
decision making powers with the EP. The Council agreed that MSY should be 
achieved in general but its position included some ambiguous language when it 
came to the timeframe, meaning it could be delayed until 2020 rather than 2015 as 
the Commission and the EP preferred (Council of the European Union 2012, p. 
12). While the Commission and the EP called for the elimination of unwanted 
catches and discards with landing obligations, the Council called for the 
obligation only to apply to species which were subject to catch quotas and were 
situated in the heavily overfished Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, the Council 
called for a gradual ban on discards, rather than the immediate ban suggested by 
the EP (Cuvillier 2012). Fisheries ministers from France and Spain would lead a 
late declaration to stop the proposed fishing discards ban following national 
lobbying but in the end they were unable to change the stance of the Council 
(Guardian 2012). Additionally, the Council supported increased regionalisation 
and stated the transferable fishing concessions should be voluntary (Council of 
European Union 2012, p. 13). As had been the case in previous reforms the 
Council approached changes to the CFP with caution. However, from the data 
available it seems the Council was generally in agreement that certain changes 
were inevitable in the architecture of the CFP and while it looked to delay the 
implementation of the MSY and discards bans, in the end it did not stand in the 
way of these changes. Hence, it can be said that the Council accepted the new 
policy image of the CFP as being predominantly centred on environment while 
attempting to defend national interests as best it could. 
A deal was reached between the Council and the EP in May 2013 and was 
introduced as a “complete overhaul of the common fisheries policy” (European 
Parliament 2013c) and would come into force in January 2014. Article 2 of 
Regulation 1380/2013 states that fishing levels are to be set at MSY levels by 
2015 where possible, and at the latest by 2020 for all fish stocks. Article 15 states 
that discarding is to be phased out and fishermen are generally obligated to land 
all catch. Article 21 stipulated that member states were free to establish a system 
of transferable fishing concessions. In Article 24 of the regulation an obligation is 
  38 
placed on the member states to see to it that fleet capacity is correct in size with 
the fishing opportunities available. The Commission gets an increased role with 
regards to the monitoring and control mechanisms and CFP decisions making is to 
become more decentralised. The Regulation specifically refers to the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development at Johannesburg in 2002 (Earth Summit 
2002), where the Union and its member states committed themselves to stop the 
continued decline of many fish stocks. Here there is a clear linkage visible 
between this isolated policy field and the two international summits on the 
environment which took place, first in 1992 and then in 2002. These external 
events caused a disruption which began a chain of reform events within the policy 
field that would not fully materialise until January 1
st
 2014. 
The reason why the 2012-13 reform was so successful cannot be put down 
solely to a punctuating event or a path dependent process, though they attributed 
to the changes. Rather I claim that the Commission exploited a policy window 
which became available due to Treaty changes. The Lisbon Treaty gave the EP 
increased powers as a co-decision maker alongside the Council and this also 
applied to the area of CFP where the increased role of the greenest EU institution 
(Lenschow 2010, p. 315), the EP which I claim represented a policy window, 
which the Commission would make full use of. In the literature on the EU it is 
widely accepted that the Commission is a policy entrepreneur within the EU due 
to its position of initiating legislation (Young 2010, p.53). However, the 
Commission is unable to open a policy window itself, but it must rather wait for 
such opportunities to materialise and then act (Ackrill et al. 2013, p. 875).  
I claim that, the reform in 2013 constitutes as a positive feedback of earlier 
reforms. The emphasis on sustainable development and achieving MSY are thus 
path dependent on earlier decisions that increased the environmental dimension of 
the CFP. This fits neatly into what Stephen D. Krasner calls path-dependent 
patterns which “are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback. Initial 
choices, often small and random, may determine future historical trajectories. 
Once a particular path is chosen, it precludes other paths […]” (Krasner 1988, p. 
83). The two critical junctures in 1992 and again in 2002 were path dependent, as 
they were originally set off by the UN Earth Summits and set off a temporal 
sequence which would lead to the 2013 reforms where the most pressing problems 
of the policy field would be solved.  
 
5.4.1 Reforming the CFP – punctuating the equilibrium, path 
dependence and a policy window 
I primarily attribute the recent changes to the CFP to a punctuating equilibrium 
event, policy window, and path dependent process. Paul Pierson states that 
“[w]hen a path dependent process is at work, early developments get deeply 
embedded in a particular political environment, modifying the incentive structures 
and hence behaviors of social actors, and thereby changing the social significance 
or pattern of unfolding of events or processes occurring later in the sequence” 
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(2000a, p. 79). The reforming process of the CFP fits quite neatly into Pierson’s 
claim as I claim that the CFP involved two critical junctures, the CFP reforms of 
1992 and 2002, which would be so important in the 2013 CFP reforms. The first 
feedback mechanism at work in the CFP would work to maintain the institutional 
arrangements created by these critical junctures. Hence, I claim that the adaptation 
of greener policy making within the political structure of the CFP, following a 
punctuated equilibrium event, reinforced the policy objectives of sustainable 
development and the goal of achieving MSY before the deadline set out in the UN 
Earth Summits. This can be likened to social and political learning, when policy 
makers become aware of problems and successes and the policy design builds on 
this (Pierson 1993, p, 612).  
Furthermore, following the creation of the Regional Advisory Councils in the 
2002 reforms and the Commission calling for contributions from various 
stakeholders in the build-up to the 2012-13 reforms, the involvement 
environmental NGOs such as Green Peace and WWF had considerably increased. 
This is an example of how the development of the policy leads to increased access 
of environmental NGOs to decision makers. This constitutes what Pierson 
describes as when “[p]olicies may also strengthen particular groups by increasing 
their access to decision makers” (Pierson 1993, p.601). Here, through a second 
feedback mechanism stemming from the earlier reforms, ideas on the importance 
of environmental protection have easier access to decision makers alongside those 
of the fisheries industry which dominated the policy in earlier years. This process 
is a prime example of a path dependent process where decision made at earlier 
steps in history of institutions can be paramount in explaining later developments. 
The critical junctures, in 1992 and 2002 created the necessary mechanisms of 
increasing returns and positive feedback that would be involved in creating the 
situation required where substantial reforms could be pushed through. 
In the case of the CFP, the Commission was able to put forth more ambitious 
reform proposal due to the policy window presented by new procedural rules. 
Here, the Commission acting as a policy entrepreneur could be said to have 
coupled the three different policy streams. The inefficient fisheries policy 
represented the problem stream, sustainable development trumped in the policies 
stream and the increased environmental awareness of the public and the 
environmental lobby interests influenced the politics stream. Hence, a more 
ambitious reform of the CFP was successfully applied to the policy field than was 
possible before. The policy window that opened up was a political window since 
it stemmed from changes in the structure of decision making rather than stemming 
from a particular problem. 
The reasoning put forth above fits well into Tallberg’s writings on the agenda-
setting role of the Commission. He states that in order for the Commission to 
exploit its agenda-setting role to the fullest it routinely makes sure either to have 
the backing of certain member states in the Council or the EP’s support to ensure 
its proposals have more likelihood of passing (2007, p. 204-205). In fact, Daviter 
maintains that the Commission strategically uses the various framing of issues to 
ensure that policies have sufficient political backing to be adopted (2007, p. 658-
659). In the case of the CFP, the Commission could only push through the radical 
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reform package required to mend a policy field clearly not functioning ideally by 
ensuring that it had a cooperative actor in the EP. Hence, the Commission used 
the policy window available brought on by the ordinary legislative procedure 
applying to the CFP, to push through legislation that ensured sustainable 
development and one that ensured reasonable exploitation of the resource, it 
originally agreed to over two decades earlier. The Council of Ministers tried to 
limit the changes and maintain the status quo, but once the policy field became 
subject to environmental issues in the 1990s it elicited more moves in the same 
direction. 
  
5.4.2 Reforming the CFP – a typical or unique process?  
In order to maximise the likelihood of successfully getting its proposals agreed to, 
the Commission can frame issues strategically. Hence, there are examples where 
the Commission has managed to bring about changes to a policy field by changing 
the discussion on an issue. Wendon discusses how the Commission managed to 
frame the discussion on social policy and opened up the policy field for more 
actors but “[b]y shifting the debate about EU social policy from technical issues to 
ethical issues of social justice, a wider range of actors was drawn into the debate” 
(1998, p. 345). Hence, the Commission managed to change the policy image of 
social policy within the EU and advance the issue of social policy within the EU. 
Here the similarities between fundamentally different policy fields are somewhat 
striking as the Commission by shifting CFP issues more towards environmental 
and sustainability, was able to change the direction of the CFP.  
The reform process of the CFP is somewhat unique in the EU context and that 
is because the Union’s fisheries policy is fundamentally different from most 
Union policy areas. The policy field involves a common resource, fishery 
products which are caught in oceans shared by numerous different member states 
and affects simultaneously different issues such as food production, the 
environment and livelihoods of those involved in the sector. Above, I argue that 
the catalyst for change in the policy area was the introduction of environmental 
issues such as sustainability and responsible exploitation which came about due to 
international arrangements participated in by the EU and its member states 
disrupted a nestled policy field. It would take several CFP reforms to fully 
materialise, an external shock which was fundamental in reforming to the policy 
area. In that sense the road the CFP has taken in its reforms, is almost identical as 
the reforms which has seen the CAP become less centralised, production less 
dependent support and overall led to a greener and more sustainable agriculture 
policy (Roederer-Rynning 2010, p. 194).  
In the case of the CAP it was the Commission which headed international 
trade negotiation on the behalf of the EU as is stipulated in Treaties and pushed 
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for reforms in line with the negotiation outcome. Indeed the similarities between 
reform processes of the CAP and the CFP are numerous. The timing of the early 
reforms in each policy field is quite similar
6
 and while I attribute the CFP changes 
to international environmental negotiations, the general consensus is that the 
major factors for CAP reforms were international trade negotiations and pressures 
brought on by the completion of the single market in the run up to 1992 (Menier 
& Nicolaidis 2011, p. 288). These pressures would be influential in breaking the 
stasis of the policy fields and move difficult issues forward.  
 The same goes for the CFP where the Commission has headed the 
international negotiations on behalf of the EU and then took up the role of a 
policy entrepreneur, always pushing for the reforms to match the international 
obligations taken upon the EU. The Council has usually acted as a buffer on these 
reform proposals pushed for by the Commission acting as a staunch defender of 
national interests and of domestic sectors. The two earlier reforms in 1992 and 
2002 were quite limited due to the decision making setup they entailed. However, 
in the latest reforms which came into effect in 2014, the EP was on equal footing 
in the decision making process as the Council and the EP is traditionally the 
greenest of the three main legislative institutions (Lenschow 2010, p. 315) and 
this would finally allow for the path towards sustainability, initiated by previous 
reforms to become complete. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 The CAP was reformed in 1992, the MacSharry reforms, and again in 1999, the Agenda 2000 reforms. While 
the CFP as is discussed here, saw reforms in 1992 and 2002. 
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6 Conclusions 
The CFP has undergone quite drastic changes since its creation in the 1980s when 
internal mechanics of the CFP looked to lead to the depletion of various fish 
stocks in EU waters if left unchanged. The problem facing the Commission as the 
initiator of policy was to find a solution that would ensure that threatened fish 
stocks would not be depleted while at the same time creating conditions where the 
fishing industry of the EU and the various regions depended on fisheries could 
continue to develop. Below I will quickly summarise the paper’s findings and 
restate the answers to the two research questions originally set out in the 
introduction chapter. 
 
 Why was there a successful reform of the Common Fisheries Policy 
possible in 2013, after years of ineffective policy and unsuccessful 
attempts at reforms? 
 
I state that the reform which came into effect in January 2014 cannot be 
explained separately but rather must be viewed as a part of a further temporal 
process. Until the 1990s only very modest change occurred within the area of 
fisheries. However, in the 1990s the EU established a more influential role in 
environmental negotiations at the United Nations. The EU would participate in 
these negotiations as an advocate for environmental friendly policies. At Rio in 
1992 the EU and its member states agreed to the ambitious Agenda 21 action plan 
which included a section devoted to the protection of the oceans through increased 
protection and by achieving sustainable development. A decade later in 
Johannesburg the parties involved, including the EU and its member states 
Agenda 21 action plan would commit to achieving the goals agreed to in Rio. I 
state that the developments in Rio and Johannesburg punctuated the equilibrium 
of the CFP and broke the stasis the policy field had been in for years. 
The decisive role the EU took in Rio would influence future reforms and 
placed the CFP on a path dependent course. Indeed, as early as in 1992, the 
Commission pushed for an ambitious reform which would be watered down 
considerably in the final regulation. However, I claim this reform constitutes a 
critical juncture where policy makers opted for increased environmental focus in 
CFP policy making. A positive feedback began when the ideas of sustainable 
development and increased attention given to environmental issues. Hence, the 
steps which were taken in an environmental direction, would lead to further steps 
in the same direction. Thus in 2002 policy makers decided on pursuing even more 
environmentally focused regulation. There is a clear positive feedback from 
earlier events of 1992 and I state that the 2002 CFP reform is a another critical 
juncture where policy maker agreed to a policy which involved a focus on 
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sustainable development and the precautionary principle which increased the 
environmental dimension of the CFP even more. This cumulated in the 2013 CFP 
reforms where goals originally set out in Rio came fully in fruition where the 
policy became centred on sustainable development, clear goals of achieving MSY 
in stock management were set and discharging of fish is in most cases phased out. 
This was only possible due to earlier events and constitutes a path dependent 
process. The first feedback mechanism at work was the adaptation of greener 
policy making within the political structure of the CFP, reinforced the policy 
objectives of sustainable development and the goal of achieving MSY. The 
second feedback mechanism was that due to earlier reforms, ideas on the 
importance of environmental protection had easier access to decision makers and 
ideas about sustainability and protection become normalised.    
Finally, I claim that a policy window opened when the ordinary legislative 
procedure was applied to the CFP. This gave increased powers to the EP, and it 
being the greenest of all the major EU decision making institutions, the 
Commission knew it could count on its support to bring about the fundamental 
change the previous reforms had failed to do. This policy window was exploited 
by the policy entrepreneur, the Commission where an ambitious proposal was 
submitted.  
  
 What do the reforms to the Common Fisheries Policy indicate about 
policy reforms in the EU in general? 
 
With regards to whether the reforms of the CFP have wider implications about 
the EU reforms on a general level, the results are a bit vaguer. The CFP involves a 
common resource, the fisheries, where national preferences have reigned supreme 
through decades of CFP policy making. However, there are similarities to reforms 
enacted within the CAP, where the Commission pushed for policy change after 
negotiations on the international scene. External pressures directed at specific 
issues can become a catalyst for policy reforms. In the case of the CAP, external 
trade issues placed pressure on the policy field, while with regards to the CFP, 
environmental issues caused similar pressure. External pressures to EU policy 
fields can have considerable saying about whether change happens by disturbing 
the policy image monopoly. When only a single policy image exists changes are 
difficult, but when the Commission is successful in shifting how issues are argued 
through the framing of the discussion as was the case with social policy discussed 
above, change can be brought to these areas. By managing seemingly insufficient 
changes, they can become reinforced through positive feedbacks where steps in 
the direction towards a specific reform, will led to further steps in that direction. 
For further research within the CFP, I would find it interesting to bring the 
level of analysis closer to actors involved. In this paper, I have attempted to get an 
understanding of the overall process involved, which meant looking more 
specifically at interactions between the EU’s major decision making institutions. 
However, it would be interesting to study internal Commission discussions on the 
process by interviewing the relevant key actors therein and similarly to go deeper 
into the internal dynamics of the Council of Ministers to see if there are similar 
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indicators of a policy images as are visible in the higher level of analysis used 
here.  
Finally, in this thesis I have attempted to explain the process involved in 
reforming a policy field within the EU characterised by many as being ineffective. 
While it might be difficult to generalise greatly about the CFP, its reform process 
highlights the sometimes complex routs reforms within the EU take. Sometimes 
seemingly small changes brought on by seemingly insignificant events, deemed 
disappointing at the time, will years later result in extensive changes far bigger 
than seemed possible earlier. In the case of the CFP, policy makers managed to 
break the vicious cycle of policy inefficiency, described by Joe Borg in the 
beginning of this paper, and got the reforms right, though it took them three 
reform procedures and over two decades of policy making to do so. 
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